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deserves to join the small but growing number of works that should grace the 
bookshelves of those interested in Japanese Buddhism.
Paul L. Swanson
RATIONALITY AND MIND IN EARLY BUDDHISM. By Frank J. 
Hoffman. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987. xii + 128 pages, notes, 
bibliography, index. ISBN 81-208-0211-X
Professor Hoffman's work is, he says, one that operates at the interface be­
tween philosophy of religion and buddhology, taking as its raw material the 
Buddhism of the Pali Nikoyas. By this he means that he wants to gain “sym­
pathetic understanding of what is internally coherent and linguistically precise 
in the language of the . . . texts studied” and to pay “attention to Asian 
thought from a critical philosophical point of view” (p. 7). Certainly, the 
main thrust of the book is philosophical: it is perhaps best understood as an 
application to early Buddhism of some of the methodologies and substantive 
conclusions developed by anglophone philosophers of religion since about 
1930.
Hoffman treats a somewhat miscellaneous collection of issues, including: 
terms for and ideas about the mental; the thesis that early Buddhism is a kind 
of empiricism; problems involved with anattO and rebirth; and problems in­
volved with describing nibbona as the “deathless” (amata). In the first three 
chapters (pp. 1-45) he deals with methodological issues, theses that, if taken se­
riously, would make his approach ineffective or inappropriate. He first rejects 
the thesis that it is improper to restrict attention to the Pali NikOyas without 
considering the later exegetical and commentarial tradition, and stresses 
(quite properly) that one can understand the NikOyas as a self-sufficient body 
of literature
He then considers whether the Buddhism of the NikOyas is unintelligible in 
virtue of systematic offences against the ‘principle of contradiction*. Hoffman 
nowhere makes quite clear what he intends by this principle; some remarks 
suggest that he intends to include the principle of excluded middle, others that 
he does not. But his main point is that the apparent contravention of this basic 
logical principle (a principle that is at least a condition upon all meaningful 
discourse) in the third and fourth lemmas of the tetralemma used so frequent­
ly in Buddhist texts, is not in fact a contravention at all. This is because logic is
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not at issue in the application of the tetralemma. Rather, Hoffman claims, the 
tetralemma is a heuristic device, applicable in debate, and aimed at disallow­
ing utterances that do not hang together in some imprecisely defined sense. 
There is much to be said for this view. Certainly, the Buddhism of the Nikayas 
show no interest in (what Western philosophers mean by) formal logic, and it 
is also correct that the use of the tetraJemma does not issue in unintelligibility. 
So all of his major points here are defensible. His restatements of the four 
alternatives, though, is less happy. For example, to formulate the second alter­
native there exists an x such thaty does not but z does apply (p. 21) ignores the 
fact that what is represented here by y and z is frequently a pair of contradic­
tories in the Pali (i.e., ... y does not but not-y does .. .). This fault also in­
fects Hoffman’s restatement of the third and fourth lemmas. There is also the 
point that there are many other possible ways of interpreting the tetralemma 
than those canvassed by Hoffman, perhaps the most promising of which is 
through the logic of empty subject terms. But perhaps it is better simply to say 
that the Nikayas show no interest in such matters, and that their use of the 
tetralemma does not make what they have to say unintelligible.
The third methodological issue with which Hoffman deals is that of Bud­
dhism’s pessimism. He gives a sensitive, thorough, and accurate sketch of the 
semantic range of the term dukkha in the Nikayas, characterizing it as both 
descriptive and evaluative. He rejects the simple and misleading claim that 
Buddhism can properly be called pessimistic simply on the grounds of the first 
noble truth.
Having cleared the ground and established that the Buddhism of the 
NikOyas can properly be studied rationally, Hoffman proceeds to do so by 
analyzing the question of mind and rebirth. He stresses the importance of con- 
tinuity-without-identity in defending the coherence of ideas about rebirth 
without there being a substantive reborn person, and offers some illuminating 
comments in this context on the absence of a developed ksanavoda in early 
Buddhism (here following Kalupahana). But he surely goes too far when he 
suggests that the idea that one needs a * ‘mysterious sort of metaphysical rub­
ber band” (p. 57) to hold the aggregates together and to individuate one 
stream (samtOna) from another rests upon a misunderstanding of the Bud­
dhist position. For if this is correct it follows that the metaphysical machinery 
later Buddhists developed to deal with this question—bhavahga, prapti, 
OlayavijhOna and the rest—manifests a misunderstanding by Buddhists of 
their own tradition. And one should always, a priori, be suspicious of claims 
by an outsider to understand the implications of a given tradition better than 
those for whom it provides meaning and nourishment.
This reviewer is in much sympathy with Hoffman’s contention that early 
Buddhism provides no answer to the question of what criteria might be ap-
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plied to determine trans-life personal identity, and with his assumption that 
this is because belief in multiple lives acted as a background assumption for 
early Buddhists, and was not yet a matter for serious philosophical debate. 
But much more could and should be said about the philosophical possibilities 
for developing such criteria, especially those “closest-continuer” causal 
theories stated and argued for by many anglophone philosophers in the last 
two decades (e.g., Robert Nozick and Derek Parfit). It really won’t do any 
longer to limit the discussion to the criteria of memory and bodily continuity, 
as though these are the only possible candidates for establishing trans-life per­
sonal identity.
In his fifth chapter (pp. 79-101) Hoffman explores the question of whether 
the problem of trans-life personal continuity can be established by appeal to 
what he calls the “Buddhist empiricism thesis” (that is, the view adopted by 
Jayatilleke, Kalupahana, et al., that all the philosophical claims made by early 
Buddhism are capable of empirical verification). Hoffman offers a clear and 
decisive rejection of the Buddhist empiricism thesis, exploring as he does so 
the epistemological significance of faith (saddM), and of the supernormal in­
sights and powers (abhinnd) gained as the adept approaches Buddhahood. 
Hoffman argues that the Buddhist empiricism thesis should be rejected in 
favor of a neo-Wittgensteinean view of religious knowledge: he suggests that 
early Buddhism had no set of propositionally-expressible religious doctrines 
which they thought either capable of or in need of verification, and that one 
should expect this since religious knowledge never has propositions as its ob­
ject (see especially pp. 95-98). This descriptive thesis about the nature of 
religious knowledge in early Buddhism is probably largely correct—much 
more nearly so, certainly, than the empiricist view; but the universal thesis 
about the nature of religious knowledge needs much more argument than 
Hoffman gives it. A proper decision would require the development of a posi­
tion on the vexed question of the nature of belief and its objects, something 
that Hoffman does not begin to undertake in this work. But his central point, 
the rejection of the descriptive thesis that early Buddhism was a form of em­
piricism, stands.
In the final chapter (pp. 103-118) Hoffman devotes attention to the problem 
of nibbdna, and gives extended discussion to A. D. P. Kalansuriya’s and Peter 
Masefield’s views on the distinction between nibbdna and parinibbdna. 
Hoffman usefully characterizes nibbdna as the “process of dying” (to 
samsara), and parinibbdna as the “limit of a Buddhist stream of life” (p. 114). 
To parapharase Wittgenstein (whose shade haunts this book): nibbdnat 
according to Hoffman, is an event in life and is lived through; parinibbdna is 
not. So Hoffman suggests, early Buddhism suggests (though does not state) 
that parinibbana is a limit which cannot be spoken about from the other
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side—and this is why no thesis about the TathAgata’s existence after death is 
affirmed by the tradition.
In conclusion: this book covers a great deal of ground, philosophical and 
exegetical, in the space of a few pages. Its strength is that it takes its texts with 
philosophical seriousness. Its weaknesses are two. First, it tries to do too 
much. The subjects treated in each of chapters 4-6 deserve (at least) a substan­
tial monograph to themselves, and while Hoffman’s conclusions are 
suggestive, they are very far from definitive. Second, a non-propositional view 
of religious belief is assumed as obviously correct (see, glaringly, pp. 98-99), a 
view which is in fact far from obvious and is, from the perspective of this 
reviewer, clearly false. But even with these caveats in mind Hoffman’s book is 
to be recommended: it is exegetically careful, lucidly written, and 
philosophically interesting. And, in the field of Buddhist studies, a work with 
any one of these virtues is rare; one with all three should be read with care.
Paul J. Griffiths
ERRATA
The following typographical errors made their way into 
Steven Heine’s “Truth and Method in DOgen Scholar­
ship” in Eastern Buddhist XX: 2. On page 137, line 20, 
the fourth kana from the end of the Japanese sentence 
should be o & rather than ya *>. On page 138, line 11, the 
third kanji in muchQ-setsumu should be ift. On page 145, 
line 23, the second kanji in u/7 should be B£. And on page 
145, the fourth line from the bottom should read “. . . 
faithful to the truth. .
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